We demonstrate the presence of a novel sidechannel in the schedulers of real-time control systems; examples of such systems include automotive systems, avionic systems, power plants and industrial control systems among others. This side channel can leak important timing information -the precise points in time when a real-time periodic task will execute in the future, that can then be used to launch devastating attacks, two of which are presented here (on real hardware platforms). Note that it is not easy to capture this timing information due to runtime variations in the schedules of real-time systems, the presence of multiple other tasks in the system and the typical constraints (e.g., deadlines) in the design of such systems. Our ScheduLeak algorithms exploit this side-channel. A complete implementation is presented in real operating systems (in Linux and FreeRTOS). ScheduLeak is particularly useful for reconnaissance in the case of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks. Timing information leaked by ScheduLeak can significantly aid other, more advanced, attacks in accomplishing their goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the scenario where you want to attack an embedded real-time system -parts of autonomous cars, industrial robots, anti-lock braking systems in modern cars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), power grid components, the NASA rovers, implanted medical devices, etc. (the list is extensive). These systems typically have limited memory and processing power, have very regimented designs (stringent timing constraints for instance) and any unexpected actions can be quickly thwarted 1 . Therefore, the opportunity to either steal a critical piece of information or the ability to launch that attack which takes control of the system is very limited. So, what is a modern-day attacker to do? Be better informed, of course! This "information" can take many forms -from an understanding of the design of the system, to knowledge of the critical components (either software or hardware). The exact knowledge depends on the type of attack and the target component: (a) say, to steal important information about when (and where) an on-board camera is used for reconnaissance or (b) to take control away from the ground operator of a remotely-controlled vehicle.
The one common underlying theme that pervades realtime systems (and something that a would-be attacker should definitely gather) is the importance of timing 2 . "Timing" includes: (i) when certain events occurs, (ii) how often they 1 Due to the design of such systems, where deadlines will be missed and the system scheduler might even shut it down. 2 As we shall see timing plays an all too important a role in the design and correct operation of real-time systems. occur, and, most importantly for this paper, (iii) when (and if) they will occur again in the future. In fact, a number of critical software components in real-time systems are designed to be repetitive in terms of timing behavior -i.e., they are periodic in nature. Examples include engine controllers in cars and aircraft, code that controls industrial and power systems, sensor data collectors, motor actuators, system heartbeat keepers, etc. As we shall see, these periodic (and often all important) tasks 3 present themselves as prime targets for our friendly neighborhood attacker.
So, how does one attack such systems, especially the periodic (and critical) components 4 ?
We have discovered the presence of a schedulerbased side-channel that leaks timing information in real-time systems -in particular those with fixed priority tasks 5 .
In fact, the above information leakage can be achieved using an unprivileged, low-priority task to reconstruct the precise timing behavior of the critical (victim) task(s). This provides our attacker with the ability to precisely predict future execution instances of the victim task at runtime! We name the algorithms that exploit this side-channel attack, "ScheduLeak". Figure 1 presents an overview of the side-channel and also how the attacker can benefit from the scheduler sidechannel-based information (the right hand side). The left side of the figure shows how a real-time system consisting of fixed-priority tasks (the boxes at the top) that results in a schedule (dotted boxes in the middle, with each task being indistinguishable from the other at runtime) can be analyzed to extract the precise execution points (the green, upward arrows) of the victim task. The right hand side of the figure shows how this timing information of the critical task can be used to launch other attacks that either leak more important information (e.g., points of interest in a UAV's mission) or destabilize the real-time control system (e.g., either cause it to crash or even prevent a remote operator from controlling it). Note that without this precise timing information, an attacker is either forced to guess when the victim task(s) will execute or launch the attacks at random points in time -both of which dilute the efficacy of the attack or result in early termination of the system (perhaps even before the attack actually succeeds). The victim is a periodic task such as an engine control task. The attacker's task is in user space.
• • • NDSS'19 task task task task Figure 1 : Overview of paper: We demonstrate how an unprivileged, low-priority task (in user space) can use the ScheduLeak algorithms to infer execution behaviors of critical, high-priority real-time task(s). The extracted information is useful for helping other attacks achieve their primary goals (two such attack instances are implemented in this paper as possible use cases).
The extraction of this run-time timing information is nontrivial. In fact, Section VII demonstrates why existing techniques are insufficient for tackling this problem; main reasons include (a) the run-time schedule depends heavily on the state of the system at startup, initialization variables and environmental conditions and (b) such real-time systems typically consist of multiple real-time and non-real-time tasks (other than the victim). Even precise knowledge of all staticallyknown system parameters is insufficient to reconstruct the future arrival times of the victim. Runtime commands such as ps or top cannot provide these "arrival times" (i.e., when future instances of the target task will start executing) since the attacker (who enters the system at an arbitrary point in time and not at system startup) has no intuition of when the first instance of each task in the system started executing. While a privileged attacker could target the scheduler of the system and extract the requisite information, such access typically requires significant effort and/or resources. On the other hand, we are able to reconstruct the information with the same level of precision using an unprivileged user space application. In fact, all that the attacker's application has to do is keep track of its own scheduling information! This, coupled with some additional (easily obtainable) information about the system, can recreate the timing information with high precision.
To be more specific, let's say that we want to override the (remote) control of a rover. In many such systems, a periodic pulse width modulation (PWM) task drives the steering and throttle. Without knowledge of the precise points in time when the PWM task updates the motor control values, the attacker is forced to employ brute force or random strategies to override the PWM values. These could either end up being ineffective or lead to the entire system being reset before the attack succeeds (see Section II for more details on this and the next scenario). Armed with knowledge from ScheduLeak, our smart adversary can now override the PWM values right after they have been written by the corresponding task -effectively overriding the actuation commands. Now consider a different scenario -that of a reconnaissance drone who's primary function is to take pictures at certain "points of interest". Our adversary would, ideally, like to get access to the photographs and the locations where they were taken. Considering that such images are typically encrypted and that breaking the encryption in a much harder problem, we could be satisfied with knowledge of where the "interesting" photos were taken. An inspection of the cache usage of the image processing task could provide hints as to when the camera is taking photos of the interesting points. If ScheduLeak can highlight future times when the image processing task will execute, we can monitor the latter's cache usage in a fairly precise manner. This information, coupled with others (say, GPS coordinates) leaks important information about the mission -viz., the points of high interest! Without the (future) timing information, we will have to launch the cache-based attack at arbitrary points in time and deal with significant loss of precision and higher noise in the results.
Scheduler covert channels, where two processes covertly communicate using the scheduler, have long been known (e.g., [1] , [2] , [3] ). In contrast, our focus is on a side-channel that leaks execution timing behavior (not deliberately!) of critical, high-priority real-time tasks to say, unprivileged, lowpriority tasks. We focus on systems with a preemptive, fixedpriority real-time task scheduler [4] , [5] since they are the most common class of real-time systems deployed in practice today [6] . It is important for our attacker to stay within the strict execution time budgets alloted to the unprivileged task (that we intend to hijack for our purposes) -especially during the phases when it is trying to observe and reconstruct the victim's timing behavior. Failing this requirement will likely cause other critical real-time functionality to fail or trigger a watchdog timeout that resets the system, leading to premature ejection of the attacker 6 . This property is crucial during the 'reconnaissance' phase of what come to be known as advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks [7] , [8] . For instance, it has been reported that attackers had penetrated and stayed resident undetected in the system for months before they initiated the actual attack in the case of Stuxnet [9] . Once they had enough information about the precise nature of the system, they were able to craft effective attacks that were tailored to that particular system.
The ScheduLeak algorithms are implemented on both a simulator and real hardware platforms running Real-Time Linux and FreeRTOS operating systems (for the two attack case studies). We evaluate the performance and scalability of ScheduLeak in Section VI, along with a design space exploration (on the simulator). The results show that our methods are effective at reconstructing schedule information and provide valuable information for later attacks to better accomplish their attack goals. To summarize, the main contributions are: 1) Novel scheduler side-channel attack algorithms that can accurately reconstruct the execution timing behaviors of critical real-time tasks in real-time systems (without requiring privileged access) [Section IV] 2) Analyses and metrics to measure the accuracy in predicting the execution and timing properties of the victim tasks [Section V and Section VI].
II. ADVERSARY CASE STUDIES
Before delving into the details of the ScheduLeak algorithms, we first study the challenges that an attacker may face in an attack against a real-time system and how the task timing information leaked via the scheduler side-channels can assist the attacker in overcoming those challenges. In this type of attacks, the attacker targets a real-time periodic task (i.e., the victim task) that handles critical functions of interest to the attacker. The attacker has certain knowledge regarding the victim task's profile in the design phase (e.g., the task's period and functions). However, runtime variables (e.g., the task's initial offset, execution times in runtime) are unknown as they are only inferable after the system initialization. We assume that the attacker got into the system as a low priority task by exploiting some existing vulnerabilities. The attacker mainly utilizes this malicious task to launch the reconnaissance attack (e.g., the ScheduLeak attack). Once the task schedule information is obtained, the main attack can be carried out either on the same malicious task or through other tasks that the attacker has prepared. The threat model is formally introduced in Section III-A. In what follows we discuss two attack cases on realistic platforms. Both attack results with and without assistance from the information obtained by the proposed ScheduLeak algorithms are presented. The demo videos for these cases can be found at https://scheduleak.github.io/.
A. Overriding Control Signals
Attack Scenario and Objective: Most real-time control systems encapsulate a number of subsystems that control actuators. For instance, in modern automotive systems, the engine control unit (ECU) controls the throttle valve in the electronic throttle body (ETB) to enable electronic throttle control (ETC). In most unmanned drones, the flight controller controls the rotary speed of the motors via the electronic speed controller (ESC). In these systems, the actuation signals such as PWM signals are periodically updated to guarantee fast and consistent response for the control mission.
Let's consider an attacker who wants to be able to stealthily override the control in such systems -for the purpose of creating an illusion of bad control by causing (temporary or (c) PWM output overridden at precise time instants. Figure 2 : An illustration of a PWM channel output on a rover system. The PWM output is updated periodically by a 50Hz task. (b) shows that an naive attack issuing the PWM updates at random instants may not be effective. (c) shows that the PWM output can be overridden by carefully issuing the PWM update right after the original update. permanent) misbehavior or even taking over the control of the system for a short time span. To do so, the attacker gets into the control system as a malicious task and tries to interleave the control signals. A brute force strategy of excessively overriding the control signals will not work in this scenario because its high attack overhead can cause other real-time tasks to miss their deadlines and lead to a system crash. In this case, knowing exact timing when the control signals are updated and interleaving the control signals at the right instants allow the attacker to effectively override the control with a low overhead.
Implementation: To illustrate, we implement this attack on a custom rover. Its control system is built with a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B board. A Navio2 module board that encapsulates various inertial sensors is attached to the Raspberry Pi board to enable the control capability. The system runs Real-Time Linux (i.e., Raspbian, kernel 4.9.45 with PREEMPT RT patch) with an APM flight stack that is one of the most popular open-source code stack in the remote and autonomous control communities. It consists of a set of real-time and non-real-time tasks to perform control-related jobs such as refreshing GPS coordinates, decoding remote control commands, performing PID calculation and updating output signals. One of the realtime tasks periodically (with a period of 20ms) updates the control signals over two PWM channels for steering and throttle via two ESCs. Figure 2 (a) shows an illustration of one of the PWM output channels working under normal circumstances. In this case, the attacker has access to a non-real-time task (a low priority Linux process). The attacker's objective is to override the control signals issued by this periodic real-time task (i.e., the victim task).
Attack Results: Figure 2 (b) and (c) show that the PWM output may be overridden by overwriting it with a different value to the PWM hardware block. However, without exact schedule information, the attacker can either send the updates at random instants (Figure 2 (b)) or periodically but at an arbitrary offset that leads to ineffective attacks. On the other hand, Figure 2 (c) displays that the attacker, after launching the ScheduLeak attack and knowing exactly when the victim task is updating the signals, can carefully issue an PWM update right after the original update to override the PWM output. Consequently, an attacker can potentially take over control of the actuators. By probing the PWM signals, we observe that the overridden PWM signals are active 85% of the time. As a result, we see that the rover no longer responds to the original control. Instead, the rover is driven by the attacker's commands. To further reduce the attacker's footprint, the attacker's task remains idle between two PWM updates, which leads to a CPU utilization of 2.6%. As a comparison, a brute-force approach takes up 77.9% CPU utilization (i.e., all available CPU resource) to achieve the same effect.
B. Inferring System Behaviors
Attack Scenario and Objective: Let's consider an UAV system executing a surveillance mission. It captures high resolution images when flying over locations of high-interest. In this case, the attacker's goal is to stealthily learn the locations targeted by the UAV. The strategy is to monitor when the surveillance camera on the UAV is switched to a execution mode in which high-resolution images are being processed. This can be done by exploiting a cache-timing side-channel attack to gauge the coarse-grained memory usage behavior of the task that handles the images. A high cache usage by this task would indicate that a high-resolution image is being processed, otherwise it would use less cache memory. However, a random sampling of the cache will result in noisy (and often useless) data since there exist other tasks in the system. In contrast, knowing when the task is scheduled to run allows the attacker to execute prime and probe attacks [10] , [11] very close to the targeted task's execution.
Implementation: This attack is implemented in a hardwarein-the-loop (HIL) simulation with a Zedboard running the FreeRTOS OS that simulates the control system on a UAV. The system consists of an image processing task (i.e., the victim task) handling photos at a rate of 30Hz and four other tasks (unknown to the attacker) -all running in a periodic fashion. The victim task processes a large size of data when the UAV reaches a GPS coordinate on a preloaded list of locations that are of interest to the system. Other real-time tasks consume differing amounts of memory. In this case, we assume that the attacker enters the system as the lowest-priority periodic task. The attacker's final goal is to utilize a cache-timing sidechannel attack to observe the victim task's memory usage and then learn the system behavior.
Attack Results: First, we consider an attacker who does not employ a ScheduLeak attack. The attacker launches the cache-timing side-channel attack at arbitrary instants due to a lack of the victim's precise timing information. As shown in Figure 3 (a), this produces many cache probes and it is hard to distinguish the cache usage of the victim task from other tasks. This results in an unsuccessful attack since no usage patterns from the victim task can be identified.
Next, let's consider the case in which the attacker leverages the ScheduLeak attack and obtains the precise task schedule information. The attacker is able to launch the cache-timing side-channel attack right before and after the victim is executed and skip those instants that are irrelevant. Figure 3 (b) Attack with ScheduLeak's assist. Figure 3 : Results of the cache-timing side-channel attacks in Section II-B. (a) demonstrates that a random mechanism launching the attack at arbitrary instants will lead to many indistinguishable cache usage results. (b) shows a successful attack in which four camera activation events (numbered by 1 to 4) are identified from the cache probes using precise time information (inferred by ScheduLeak).
Suggested font size (18pt) result of the precise cache probe against the victim task. We see that the attack greatly reduces the noise caused by other tasks (96.9% of the cache probes are omitted) and is able to precisely identify the victim task's memory usage behavior. The attacker can therefore determine that the camera is activated if the victim task's memory usage is high or deactivated if the memory usage is low. As a result, four camera activation instants can be identified from the spikes shown in Figure 3 (b).
The attacker may couple this information with the flight route information that the attacker obtains through other measures, to infer the locations of high-interest, as shown in Figure 4 .
C. Implications for the Case Studies
In these attack cases, their final attack goals cannot be achieved (at least not without risking detection) without the precise task runtime schedule information. Therefore, obtaining such information beforehand becomes a vital step to the success for these attacks. In this paper, we introduce the scheduler side-channel and the ScheduLeak algorithms that achieve exactly that. As stated, the ScheduLeak algorithms are implemented and actually used in the above cases. The ScheduLeak algorithms yield a high inference precision in inferring the victim task's initial offset -99.85% for the first case and 99.998% for the second case (see Section VI-A for the definition). For the rest of the paper, we focus on the core of the ScheduLeak algorithms. In next section we formally introduce the adversary model and the system model.
III. ADVERSARY AND SYSTEM MODEL

A. Adversary Model
In this paper, we are concerned with attacks that target a uniprocessor real-time system 7 . The system consists of nonreal-time and real-time (periodic or sporadic) tasks. We assume that an attacker is interested in targeting one of the critical tasks in the system that we henceforth refer to as a "victim task". We also assume that the victim task is a real-time, periodic task. Many critical functions in real-time control systems are periodic in nature, say for sending control signals to actuate the system at a predetermined rate, e.g., the code that controlled the frequency of the slave variable-frequency drives in the Stuxnet example [9] . In all such cases, the period of the task is strictly related to the characteristics of the physical system; hence, we can assume that the attacker is able to gain knowledge of the victim task's period beforehand. However, the attacker does not know the initial conditions at system startup 8 (e.g., the task's initial offset) and may not have information on all the tasks in the system. All other tasks in the system can be either real-time or non-real-time, depending on the design of the system. Hence, the methods developed in this paper can target systems that have a mix of periodic, sporadic and non-real-time tasks.
In APT attacks, the ultimate goal of the attacker varies with adversaries and the systems under attack. The attacker may plan to interfere with the operations of critical tasks or eavesdrop upon certain information via shared resources, or even carry out debilitating attacks at a critical juncture when the victim system is most vulnerable. As evidenced in Section II, often such attacks on real-time systems require the attacker to precisely gauge the timing properties of victim tasks. In this paper, we introduce attack algorithms that help attacker obtain such valuable information in the reconnaissance stage. In this context, the main goal of the attacker is to precisely infer when the victim task is scheduled to run in the near future.
Note that our focus in this paper is on how to reconstruct the timing behavior of a higher-priority, real-time victim task using the scheduler side-channel without violating the realtime constraints. We do this from the vantage point of a compromised, lower-priority ("observer") task. We do not focus on how attackers get access to the observer task. They 7 Most real-time systems still use simple processors as part of their design. This is to ensure predictable behavior and due to the complexity of analyzing modern processors [12] . 8 Note that not all tasks have to start together at system startup; each periodic task is usually activated after some required initialization procedure, which can take a variable amount of time. Furthermore, a staggered startup of the tasks in the system significantly increases the challenge for would-be attackers in attempting to reconstruct the precise timing behavior of victim tasks. In this paper we show how to overcome such problems. 
System Assumptions A1
Tasks are either non-real-time or real-time (periodic or sporadic) except the victim task which is a periodic real-time task. A2
A preemptive, fixed-priority scheduler is used for real-time tasks.
Attacker's Capabilities (Requirements) R1
The attacker has the control of one user-space task (observer task) that has priority lower than the victim task.
R2
The attacker has knowledge of the victim task's period.
R3
The attacker has access to a system timer on the system. Attacker's Goals G1
Being able to infer the victim task's initial offset and predict future arrivals (future execution points in time).
could use any number of known methods -from compromised insiders, to supply chain vulnerabilities in a multi-vendor development model (e.g., as is usually practiced for large, complex systems such as aircraft, automobiles, industrial control systems, etc.) [13] , to vulnerabilities in the software, network vulnerabilities, among others. Recent work has demonstrated that real-time control systems like commercial drones contain design flaws and hence are vulnerable to compromise [14] , [15] . In particular, a system with a Linux kernel is arguably vulnerable to attacks due to its complexity. The details of gaining access to an observer task are out of scope for this paper. Nevertheless, it is important to note that we do not require the observer task to be a privileged task in the system. A summary of assumptions, attacker's capabilities and goals is given in Table I .
B. Time Model
We assume that the attacker has access to a system timer on the target system and therefore time measured by the attacker has the resolution equal to or lower than this system timer. The timer can be either a software or a hardware timer (e.g., a 64bit Global Timer in FreeRTOS or a CLOCK MONOTONIC-based timer in Linux kernel). We consider a discrete time model [16] . We assume that a unit of time equals a timer tick of the timer the attacker has access to and the tick count is an integer. All system and task parameters are multiples of a time tick. We denote an interval starting from time point a and ending at
C. Real-time Task Model
We consider a system consisting of real-time and non-realtime tasks in this paper. Along with a default scheduler for non-real-time tasks, a preemptive, fixed-priority scheduler (the most common class of real-time schedulers) is used to schedule the real-time tasks in the system. Here, we are only concerned with the real-time tasks since most modern system kernels handle the group of real-time tasks with a priority greater than the non-real-time tasks. As a result, non-real-time tasks do not influence the schedule of real-time tasks.
Let's consider the system containing n fixed-priority (i.e., statically assigned) real-time tasks Γ = {τ 1 , ...τ n } [5] . A realtime task τ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, can be either a periodic or a sporadic task. A periodic task arrives regularly with a fixed length (i.e., period) between adjacent arrivals. A sporadic task arrives at random time points with a given minimum length (i.e., inter-arrival time) between adjacent arrivals. The victim task, denoted by τ v , is a periodic task, as stated in Section III-A. Each real-time task is characterized by (p i , d i , e i , a i , pri i ) where p i is the period (or the minimum inter-arrival time), d i is the relative deadline 9 , e i is the worst-case execution time (WCET) 10 [17] , a i is the initial task offset (i.e., the arrival time) and pri i is the priority. We assume that every real-time task has a distinct period 11 and that a task's deadline is equal to it's period 12 [5] . We use the same symbol τ i to represent a task's job (or instance) for simplicity of notation. We further assume that each task is assigned the priority pri i using an assignment algorithm (e.g., rate-monotonic [5] , criticalitybased, table-based), and that task priorities are distinct. Let hp(τ i ) denote the set of tasks that have higher priorities than that of τ i and lp(τ i ) denote the set of tasks that have lower priorities than τ i . We define an "execution interval" of a task τ i to be an interval of time [a, b) during which the task runs continuously. For example, if τ i runs to its worst case execution time e i , then for a particular instance of τ i , the length of the execution interval equals e i if τ i is not preempted. If τ i is preempted then the execution will be partitioned into multiple execution intervals, each of which has length less than e i .
D. Observer Task
As previously mentioned, we refer to the lower-priority task that the attacker controls as an "observer task" and it is denoted by τ o ∈ Γ. The only constraint we place on τ o is that it has a lower priority than the victim task, pri v > pri o . The observer task can be either a real-time or a non-real-time task. Recall that non-real-time tasks have lower priority than realtime tasks, so it is preferable for the attacker to compromise and utilize a non-real-time observer task. In contrast, being a periodic real-time task is a more restrictive condition since it reduces the flexibility available to an attacker (this will be clearer as we introduce the algorithms). That is, the case where a periodic observer task with a period p o and priority pri o can succeed, a non-real-time or a real-time sporadic (given the same p o as the minimum inter-arrival time and the same priority pri o ) observer task can also succeed. Therefore, when analyzing the attack capability in Section V, we will consider a real-time periodic observer task (or a real-time sporadic observer task running at a constant inter-arrival time).
In this paper, we use the observer task to infer the initial offset a v that can be used to predict future arrivals of the victim task. We let the observer task "monitor" its own execution intervals by using a system timer. Note that reading system time does not require privilege in most operating systems (e.g., invoking clock gettime() in Linux). The main concept here is that the intervals when the observer task is active (i.e., no higher-priority task is running) cannot contain the victim task's execution or its arrival time point since the victim would have preempted the observer task. However, there are also other higher-priority tasks that can impact the observer task's execution behaviors. To the attacker, the challenge is to then filter out unnecessary information (about other higher-priority tasks) and extract the correct information about the victim task. This is explained in the following section.
IV. SCHEDULEAK
A. Overview
We now introduce the core algorithms of the ScheduLeak attacks. As mentioned earlier, the goals of the attacker are: (a) collect execution intervals that contain the victim task's schedule information and (b) analyze the intervals to infer the initial offset and future execution time points for the victim. A high-level overview of the various analyses stages is introduced next (also depicted in Figure 1 ). First, the observer task measures and reconstructs its own execution intervals (i.e., when it itself is active). We then introduce the notion of a "schedule ladder diagram" -a timeline that is divided into windows that match the repeating period of the victim task, and map the measured intervals onto this timeline. A "union" of the various periods on the timeline allows us to extract the initial offset for the victim task. This information is then used to predict the future arrivals of the victim. Since the victim task is periodic in nature, the offset from the start of the section of the timeline that it falls under directly translates to the offset from startup when the first instance of the victim task executed. Hence, the steps in our proposed ScheduLeak attack algorithms are: 1) Reconstruct execution intervals of the observer task: the observer task utilizes a system timer to reconstruct its execution intervals. [Section IV-B] 2) Analyze the execution intervals: the execution intervals are organized in a schedule ladder diagram for further analysis of the victim task's arrivals and initial offset.
[Section IV-C] 3) Infer the victim task's initial offset and future arrivals:
in the final step, the attacker infers the initial offset of the victim task by extracting the information from the schedule ladder diagram. The future execution time points of the victim task are predicted by using the inferred initial offset. [Section IV-D]
B. Reconstruction of Execution Intervals
The first step is to reconstruct the observer task's execution intervals (i.e., the intervals when the observer task is itself active). We achieve this by implementing a function in the observer task that keeps track of time read from the system timer. For instance, when the observer task executes, it keeps polling the system timer. When it gets preempted, the polling obviously stops. When it is scheduled to run again (indicating that the higher-priority tasks, potentially including the victim task, have completed execution) the polling starts again. Hence, the continuous active execution intervals of the observer task can be reconstructed by examining the polled time stamps. The function is shown in Algorithm 1 and explained next. Algorithm 1 returns one execution interval of the observer task for every invocation. If required, the attacker can invoke this algorithm multiple times to reconstruct the execution intervals in detail. However, if a real-time observer task is used, then this might take up significant amount of execution time in a period -perhaps more than what was budgeted for the observer task. To satisfy the real-time constraints (i.e., all realtime tasks must meet their deadlines), the real-time observer task should not run more than its worst-case execution time, e o . Furthermore, even if the attacker does not exceed the allocated execution budget for itself, it may want to save some budget for other purposes such as performing the analyses to reconstruct the timing information of the victim. Hence, we define a parameter, λ, whose value is set by the attacker, to limit the running time of the aforementioned algorithm for the real-time periodic observer task. This "maximum reconstruction time", λ, is an integer in the range 0 ≤ λ ≤ e o . Hence, the total length of the reconstructed execution intervals is λ in each execution period and this leaves the timespan e o −λ for the observer task to carry out other computations. As a result, the service levels guaranteed by the original (clean) system is still maintained -thus reducing the risk of triggering system errors. On the flip side, the algorithm may not be able to capture all possible execution intervals and this could reduce the fidelity/precision of the final results. Section V-B discusses how to compute good values for λ. Figure 5 shows examples of reconstructed execution intervals.
C. Analysis of Execution Intervals
Once the observer task's execution intervals are reconstructed, we analyze the data to extract the information about the victim task. We do this by organizing the obtained execution intervals into a timeline split into lengths of the victim task's period p v (recall that p v is one of the known quantities for the attacker). The purpose of this step is to place the execution intervals of the observer task within the periodic windows of the victim task. The timeline with length of the victim task's period allows the attacker to see how the observer task's execution intervals are influenced by the victim task as well as other higher-priority tasks.
To better illustrate the idea of the timeline and the proposed algorithms, we will use a "schedule ladder diagram" (defined below) to represent the construction of the timeline in this paper. The rows in the schedule ladder diagram can be merged into a single-line timeline (and is just an analytical "trick"). A schedule ladder diagram is a skeleton consisting of a set of adjacent timelines of equal lengths -that match the victim task's period p v . The start time of the top section can be an arbitrary point in time assigned by the attacker (e.g., the time instant when the algorithms are first invoked). The columns + + 2 … Figure 6 : The skeleton of a schedule ladder diagram. It is used by the observer to organize its execution intervals. The start time t of the schedule ladder diagram (i.e., the beginning of the top timeline) is an arbitrary point in time, as assigned by the attacker. The width of each timeline matches the victim task's period p v . The relative offset between the start time t and the true arrival column is defined by δ v .
in the schedule ladder diagram are "unit time columns". So, there are p v time columns. The skeleton of a schedule ladder diagram is illustrated in Figure 6 . From the diagram, plotted based on p v , we make the following observation: This observation is true because τ v is a periodic task that arrives every p v time units and the schedule ladder diagram is plotted with its interval equal to p v . We define the column where the arrivals of the victim task are located as the "true arrival column", denoted by δ v . Thus, the correlation between the initial offset a v and the true arrival column δ v can be derived by (t + δ v − a v ) mod p v = 0, where t represents the (arbitrary) start time of the schedule ladder diagram assigned by the attacker. This is also depicted in Figure 6 .
The observation also means that the time columns [δ v , δ v + bcet v ), where bcet v is the best case execution time of τ v (i.e., the shortest possible execution time of τ v ), will always be occupied by either the victim task or other higher-priority task executions. From this observation, we define the following theorem for placing the observer task's execution intervals on this schedule ladder diagram.
does not contain any execution interval of the observer task.
Proof: From Observation 1, the victim task τ v arrives regularly at time column a v . Upon an arrival of τ v , it is scheduled to be executed at the arrival column/instant δ v . If there exists lower priority tasks lp(τ v ) in execution at δ v column, the victim task preempts such tasks until it finishes its job with length of bect v at a minimum. In the case that there exists higher priority tasks hp(τ v ) that are executing or arriving during [δ v , δ v + bcet v ), the victim task τ v is preempted. Under this circumstance, if the observer task τ o had arrived during [δ v , δ v + bcet v ), as a lower priority task, it is also preempted. Therefore, the time columns [δ v , δ v + bcet v ) cannot contain the execution intervals of the observer task.
Note that δ v and bcet v are unknown to the attacker. If we place the obtained execution intervals of the observer task on the schedule ladder diagram and calculate the union of those execution intervals for every time column, then, based on Theorem 1, there must exist an empty interval of continuous time columns of which the length is equal to or greater than bcet v . Here, an empty interval represents the time columns where the observer task is always inactive and hence do not contain any execution intervals of the observer task. Those empty time columns are candidates for containing the true arrival time of the victim task. There may also exist time columns that are empty due to other higher-priority tasks. Yet, since other tasks have distinct arrival periods (or random arrivals for realtime sporadic tasks and non-real-time tasks), those empty time columns tend to be scattered, compared to [δ v , δ v +bcet v ), and are expected to be eliminated as more execution intervals of the observer task are collected. In practice, our results indicate that this process works effectively and is mostly stabilized after an attack duration of 5 · LCM (p o , p v ). To this end, it's easier to think of the problem as the process of eliminating those time columns that are not true arrival columns for the victim. We use the following theorem to remove these "false" time columns.
Theorem 2. The time columns in which there exists at least one execution interval of the observer task cannot be true arrival columns.
Proof: From Theorem 1, the observer task is always preempted within time columns [δ v , δ v +bcet v ). In other words, the execution intervals of the observer task can only appear at time columns [0, δ v ) and [δ v + bcet v , p v ). Therefore, the execution intervals of the observer task will not be present at the true arrival column (δ v ) and also it would have been preempted.
Based on Theorem 2, we can remove corresponding time columns when an execution interval of the observer is placed on the schedule ladder diagram. Ultimately, the attacker can eliminate most of the false time columns, thus leaving only a small portion of the time columns (containing [δ v , δ v + bcet v ) based on Theorem 1) to infer the victim task's initial offset. The algorithm to infer the victim task's initial offset is introduced next. Example 1. Consider a system that has the real-time task set Γ = {τ 1 , τ o , τ v , τ 4 }. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all tasks are periodic tasks in this example (though our analysis can work with periodic, sporadic and mixed systems as well). The task parameters are presented in the table below (on the left). Note that pri i > pri j means that τ i has a higher number that τ j . Thus, task τ 1 has the lowest priority while task τ 4 has the highest priority and τ v has higher priority than τ o . Let the maximum reconstruction duration λ be 1 and the start time of the attack be 0 (as a result, a v equals δ v in this example). Assuming the attacker has executed the first step/algorithm for some duration, the table below lists the reconstructed execution intervals of the observer task. Note that since τ 1 has priority lower than the observer task τ o , it does not influence the execution of τ o . Then, we place the reconstructed execution intervals in a schedule ladder diagram of width equal to the victim task's period p v . This operation is shown in Figure 7 (a). To better understand the effectiveness of the schedule ladder diagram in profiling the victim task's behavior, we plot the original, complete, schedule on the ladder diagram in Figure 14 in Appendix so that readers get a better sense of it. This gives us an insight into the relation between the execution intervals of τ o and that of the victim task.
From the schedule ladder diagram in Figure 7 (a), we perform a union of the execution intervals in each time column. The results are shown in Figure 7 (b) -essentially a set of execution intervals and empties. The empty intervals (i.e., ones without execution intervals) are candidate time columns that contain the true arrival column we want to extract. These empty intervals are passed to the final step to infer the initial offset/arrival times of the victim task.
D. Inference of Initial Offset and Future Arrival Instants
We now get to the final step -inferring the future arrival instants of the victim task -our original objective. But, first, we need to calculate the initial offset of the victim task. What we get from the schedule ladder diagram (i.e., the timeline of periods of the victim task) is a set of "empty" intervals of candidate time columns that contains the true arrival column of the victim. The number of empty intervals depends on the number of collected execution intervals as well as the "noise" introduced by other, higher-priority, tasks (hence, there is no guarantee that all false empty intervals can be eliminated in the end). Since the false empty intervals tend to be scattered, compared to [δ v , δ v + bcet v ), due to distinct arrival periods for other real-time periodic tasks or random arrivals for realtime sporadic tasks, we take the largest empty interval as our inference for the interval that may contain the true arrival column of the victim task. While this strategy is not always guaranteed to succeed, our evaluation (both case studies in Section II and performance evaluation in Section VI) shows that we are able to reconstruct the future arrival instants for victim tasks with a high degree of precision. We then pick the start of this empty interval as the inferred true arrival column, denoted byδ v . The inferred initial offset, denoted byâ v , can then be derived asâ v = (t +δ v ) mod p v , where t represents the start time of the schedule ladder diagram.
Example 2. The intervals obtained from Example 1 correspond to the time columns [1, 3) , [5, 6) and [7, 8) . According to the algorithm, the largest interval, [1, 3) , is selected. The beginning point of such a interval is then taken as the inference of the victim task's true arrival column, which becomesδ v = 1. In this example, the true arrival column is δ v = 1. Therefore, the algorithms correctly infer the true arrival column of the victim task and the initial offset can be derived accordingly. Now, the future arrivals of the victim task can easily be computed by t +â v + p v · T , T ∈ N, where t is the starting time of the schedule ladder diagram,â v is the inferred initial offset of τ v , p v is the period of τ v and T is the desired arrival number. The result of this calculation is the exact time of the T th arrival of the victim task.
Note that we are able to draw all of these inferences by just using observations from the observer task only and no other knowledge of runtime behavior of any other task!
V. ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS
A. Analyzing Attack Capability
We now discuss how to determine the attack capability of the observer task against the victim task. That is, in this context, whether the observer task's observation contains the arrival information of the victim task. This analysis is mainly for the observer task being a periodic real-time task since its observability is restricted by the real-time constraints. A non-real-time observer task is not limited by a period and the attack capability depends on its runtime duration (this will be explained later in this section). Therefore, understanding the correlation of the schedule between the observer task and the victim task is vital.
From Observation 1, we know that the periodic arrivals of τ v land at exactly the same time column in the schedule ladder diagram. Thus, a conservative condition ensuring that the scheduled, anticipated execution intervals of the observer task can overlap the arrival column of τ v is: when those scheduled execution intervals appear in all possible time columns in the schedule ladder diagram. Furthermore, when considering both τ v and τ o as periodic tasks, their relative hyper-period (i.e., the length when the schedule of the given tasks repeats) is computed by their least common multiple, LCM (p o , p v ). Hence, we have the following observation about the relationship between τ o and τ v on the schedule ladder diagram.
Observation 2. In the schedule ladder diagram, the offset between the time column of each observer task's arrival (i.e., the scheduled execution) and the true arrival column repeats after LCM (p o , p v ).
This observation also means that the coverage of the time columns by the observer repeats every LCM (p o , p v ). Thus, for the observer task to observe all p v time columns, we have the following theorem: Theorem 3. If the given observer task τ o and the victim task τ v satisfy the inequality e o ≥ GCD(p o , p v ), then the scheduled execution of τ o is guaranteed to appear in all time columns of the schedule ladder diagram of τ v .
Proof: From Observation 2, the time column offset of the observer task's execution repeats every LCM (p o , p v ). Therefore, the aforementioned condition (i.e., the scheduled execution of τ o appears in all possible time columns) can be described by the inequality LCM (po,pv) po · e o ≥ p v . Then, by using LCM (p o , p v ) = popv GCD(po,pv) , we can derive a condition for e o that guarantees that the observer task can detect the arrivals of the victim task to be e o ≥ GCD(p o , p v ).
From Theorem 3, we can find that the observer task's execution is able to observe some time columns more than once when e o > GCD(p o , p v ). If e o ≥ 2 · GCD(p o , p v ), the observer task observes all time columns more than once. The redundant coverage means that the true arrival column will be observed more frequently comparing to lower ratio of e o to GCD(p o , p v ). To better profile the observer task's coverage, we further define the coverage ratio that depicts the observer task's capability against the victim task as follows
The coverage ratio can be loosely interpreted as the proportion of the time columns that are observable by the observer task in the schedule ladder diagram. If all p v time columns are observed by the observer task's observation,
can be greater than one if e o is greater than GCD(p o , p v ). It means that the observer task can observe all time columns more than once with greater e o . It's worth mentioning that p o can be ignored in the case of a nonreal-time observer task. Then the coverage ratio becomes eo pv , where e o can be interpreted as the non-real-time observer task's runtime duration that depends on how long the attacker resides in the system. Therefore, we have the following theorem to determine the observer task's capability against the victim task: Theorem 4. Given the observer task τ o and the victim task τ v , the capability of τ o against τ v is determined by: Proof: From Theorem 3, if e o ≥ GCD(p o , p v ) (i.e., C(τ o , τ v ) ≥ 1), then the observer task's execution can appear in all time columns in the schedule ladder diagram which contain the true arrival column a v . Thus the true arrival time column is enclosed in the observer task's execution. If e o < GCD(p o , p v ) (i.e., 0 ≤ C(τ o , τ v ) < 1), then the observer task's execution can only appear in some time columns in the schedule ladder diagram. The true arrival time column a v may not be observable by the observer task's execution, thus the observer task may not be able to infer the correct information about τ v .
Note that the second condition in Theorem 4 does not necessarily mean that τ v is absolutely not inferable by τ o . It only implies that τ o 's execution cannot appear in all possible time columns. Depending on the degree of the coverage, the attacker may still be able to observe the true arrival column.
B. Choosing Maximum Reconstruction Duration λ
Recall that, the maximum reconstruction duration λ is used to limit the amount of execution time in a period taken by a periodic real-time observer task for running the attack algorithms. The remaining execution time e o − λ can be used by the attacker to deliver the original functionality of τ o while making progress on the capturing of execution data. As the attacker wants to stay stealthy and minimize disruption to the original functionality during this phase, it is desirable to use smaller λ (i.e., larger e o − λ) values. Here, we discuss how to choose the value of λ for a given periodic real-time observer task τ o and a victim task τ v .
In Section V-A, we defined the notion of coverage ratio that profiles the observer task's attack capability. It can be interpreted as the number of times that the execution of the observer task can observe all p v time columns in the schedule ladder diagram. Since a one-time coverage of all p v time columns is sufficient to hit the true arrival column, the additional coverage is redundant and can be traded for other purposes. Based on this idea, we use the following theorem to determine the value for λ.
Theorem 5. Given the observer task τ o and the victim task τ v , the minimum value of λ for the best possible coverage is determined by:
Proof: From Equation 1, the coverage of given λ can be computed by λ GCD(po,pv) . Theorem 3 indicates that C(τ o , τ v ) = 1 is enough to ensure that the execution of the observer task can cover all p v time columns once. Therefore, for 
C. Observer Task: Real-time vs. Non-real-time
The ScheduLeak algorithms can be applied to an observer task being either a real-time task or a non-real-time task since the computation only relies on the victim task's period. Yet, given the same target system, the latter (non-real-time) performs better than the former as the real-time observer task is restricted by its real-time constraints. This inference can also be drawn from the coverage ratio we discussed in Section V-A. The non-real-time observer task potentially has no limits on its coverage ratio as well as the maximum reconstruction duration λ and is only limited by how long the attacker stays in the system. In contrast, special care needs to be taken by the attacker when a periodic real-time observer task is engaged. As a result, the introduced algorithms and theorems cover the worst case condition when carrying out the reconnaissance.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate ScheduLeak, we define the following two metrics:
(i) Inference Success Rate: We define an inference to be successful if attacker is able to exactly infer the victim task's initial offset (recall from Section IV-D that once we know the initial offset, we can easily predict the future arrival instants). Therefore, the result of an inference is either true or false. The inference success rate is an average of the true/false results for a given test condition from a set of task sets.
(ii) Inference Precision Ratio: In the case that the inference is not exact, we define a metric to evaluate the degree of the inference precision (i.e., how close we got to the actual values). In this paper, the inference target is the initial offset of the victim task. We first compute the distance between the inference and the true value by = |â v − a v | , where a v is the initial offset of the victim task andâ v is the inferred initial offset. We then define the inference precision ratio:
(Inference Precision Ratio) The inference precision ratio, denoted by I o v , is computed by
p v is the period of the victim task. The inference precision ratio is a real number within 0 ≤ I o v ≤ 1. It allows us to know how close the inference is to the true initial offset. I o v = 1 indicates that the inference of the initial offset a v is absolutely correct.
B. Evaluation Setup
We use simulations of real-time tasks to evaluate our algorithms. The time resolution in the simulations is 0.1ms. We only include real-time tasks (both periodic and sporadic) in the simulations since they are the real load that impacts the schedule. Also, a periodic real-time observer task is considered here because it represents the worst case attack scenario for the adversary, as discussed in Section V-C. We test our algorithms with randomly generated synthetic task sets. (Note: this is a standard method for evaluating algorithmic facets of realtime systems. Using synthetic task sets gives us the ability to also explore a wide variety of situations.) We use the commonly used rate-monotonic algorithm [5] to assign the priorities of real-time tasks, i.e., a task with a shorter period is assigned a higher priority. We only pick those task sets that are schedulable 13 by preemptive, fixed-priority scheduling algorithms. The task sets are grouped by CPU utilization from [0.001+0.1·x, 0.1+0.1·x] where 0 ≤ x ≤ 9. For example, the 13 During the design of real-time systems, engineers test what is known as the "schedulability" of the system -essentially, whether given the current set of tasks and the system setup (processor, etc.), will all instances of all realtime tasks complete before their respective deadlines. If even a single instance of a single real-time task does not meet its deadline then the system is deemed unschedulable and unsafe. There exists a large body of work in the real-time system domain aimed at verifying the schedulability of such systems [6] , [4] .
[0.501, 0.6] group contains the task sets that occupy 50.1% to 60% of CPU utilization 14 . Each utilization group consists of 6 subgroups that have a fixed number of tasks from 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15 respectively. Each subgroup contains 100 task sets. In each task set, 50% of the tasks are generated as periodic tasks (i.e., 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 periodic tasks for each subgroup respectively) while the rest of the tasks are generated as sporadic tasks. The initial arrival time (i.e., task offset) for a task is randomly selected between 0 and the task's period (i.e., 0 ≤ a i < p i ). In the case of sporadic tasks, we take the generated task period as the minimum inter-arrival time.
The observer task and the victim task are assigned when generating the task sets. Since only the tasks that have higher priorities influence the observations, we skip the generation of lower-priority tasks lp(τ o ). As a result, the observer task always has the lowest priority (i.e., pri o = 1) in these generated task sets. For the victim task, two conditions are considered: (i) pri v = 2 and (ii) pri v = |hp(τ o )|. It is to test the two boundary conditions (i.e., when no task and the most tasks exist in between the observer task and the victim task). Further, we set the coverage ratio to be C(τ o , τ v ) ≥ 1 when generating the task sets, except for evaluating the impact of the coverage ratio. This is because we want to evaluate whether the algorithms can truly produce confident inferences while the attacker has the theoretical guarantee of the attack capability (i.e., having full coverage of all p v time columns, as per Theorems 3 and 4). The maximum construction duration λ is set based on Theorem 5. Therefore, λ = GCD(p o , p v ).
For varying the execution times of the tasks and adding jitter to the inter-arrival times (for the sporadic tasks), we use the normal and Poisson distributions respectively. Note that Poisson distribution is used for inter-arrival time variation because the probability of each occurrence (i.e., each arrival of the sporadic task) is independent in such a distribution model. First, a schedulable task set is generated (using the aforementioned parameters). Then, for a task τ i , the average execution time is computed by wcet i · 80%, where 80% is chosen empirically. Next, we fit a normal distribution N (µ, σ 2 ) for the task τ i . We let the mean value µ be wcet i · 80% and find the standard deviation σ with which the cumulative probability P (X ≤ wcet i ) is 99.99%. As a result, such a normal distribution produces variation such that 95% of the execution times are within ±10% · wcet i . To ensure that the task set remains schedulable, we adjust the maximum modified execution time to be equal to WCET if it exceeds WCET. For sporadic tasks, the average inter-arrival time is computed by p i ·120%, where 120% is chosen empirically. We use a Poisson distribution of λ = p i ·120% to generate the varied inter-arrival times during the simulation. Similarly, so as to not violate the given minimum inter-arrival time for a sporadic task, we regenerate the modified inter-arrival time if it drops below p i . Figure 8 : The results of the success rate and the inference precision ratio by running the algorithms for different lengths of time. It indicates that longer attack durations can increase the chance of success and yield better inference precision. The points are connected only as a guide.
(Observation 2). In the best case (i.e., no task preempts the observer task except the victim task), LCM (p o , p v ) is the minimum duration needed to observe all p v time columns and get the right inference. Therefore, we use LCM (p o , p v ) as the unit of time spent on the attack to evaluate the algorithms. In this experiment, we generate task sets as explained in Section VI-B and run the ScheduLeak algorithms with a fixed duration of 10 · LCM (p o , p v ). Figure 8 shows the results of this experiment.
In Figure 8 , each point of the inference precision ratio is the mean of the individual inference precision ratio of 12000 task sets for a given attack duration. The results suggest that the longer the attack id sustained, the higher success rate and precision ratio the algorithms can achieve. It is because a longer attack time means more execution intervals are reconstructed by the observer task. On the other hand both success rate and precision ratio plateau after 5 · LCM (p o , p v ) with the success rate and the precision ratio higher than 97% and 0.99 respectively. This shows that the proposed algorithms can produce inference with precision in a very short time and the additional gains obtained from running longer are minuscule. For this reason, we will evaluate the algorithms with a duration of 10 · LCM (p o , p v ) in the rest of the experiments below.
2) The Number of Tasks and Task Set Utilization: Next, we evaluate the impact of (a) the number of tasks in a task set and (b) the task set utilization. Figure 9 displays a 3D wire frame graph that shows the averaged inference precision ratio for each combination of the number of tasks and the task utilization subgroup. The results suggest that (i) the inference precision ratio decreases as the number of tasks in a task set increases and (ii) the inference precision ratio increases as the task set utilization increases. The worst inference precision ratio happens when there are 15 tasks in a task set with the utilization group [0.001, 0.1], -these are boundary conditions for both the number tasks and the utilization in this experiment. The impact of the number of tasks is straightforward as having more tasks in hp(τ o ) means that the observer task will be preempted more frequently. This makes it hard for the observer task to eliminate the time columns that are not true arrival columns; thus the inference precision ratio is reduced. For the impact of the task set utilization, having low utilization implies that the execution times of the tasks are small and there exists a lot of gaps in the schedule. Hence, the observer Figure 9 : The impact of the number of tasks in a task set and the task set utilization. The result shows that the algorithms perform better with small number of tasks and high task set utilization. may get many small and scattered empty-intervals. Since we let the algorithms pick the largest interval to infer the true arrival column, multiple small intervals are problematicthe algorithm has a hard time picking the right interval that contains the true arrival. Hence the errors are compounded.
3) Priority of the Victim Task: From the previous experiments we learned that the number of tasks has an impact on the inference performance. However, the relative position of the victim task should also be taken into account when the number of tasks varies. Therefore, we focus on the victim task's position (i.e., its priority in a task set) here to further analyze what influences the algorithms. As stated in Section VI-B, we consider two boundary conditions for the victim task's position: (i) pri v = 2 and (ii) pri v = |hp(τ o )|. Figure 10 and Figure 11 present the experiment results for the two conditions. Figure 10 shows that the huge drop in Figure 9 as the number of tasks increases is mainly caused by the condition pri v = |hp(τ o )| when the victim task has the highest priority. Figure 11 also gives the similar indication that the drop in low utilization groups in Figure 9 is a result of the condition pri v = |hp(τ o )|. It's worth noting that, since we use the ratemonotonic algorithm to assign the priority, pri v = 2 means that the victim task has a large period, hence potentially has greater execution time. It is good for the algorithms as we pick the largest interval to make an inference in the last step. In contrast, pri v = |hp(τ o )| means that the victim task has the smallest period in a task set. This would cause problems when trying to pick the right interval for the inference.
4) Task Sets with Sporadic, Periodic and Mix of Both:
Here, we examine the impact of the mix of sporadic and periodic tasks. We generate task sets with 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% sporadic tasks in a task set. The rest of the tasks in a task set are periodic tasks. The group of 0% indicates that all tasks are periodic tasks and the group of 100% means that all tasks are sporadic tasks in a task set. The results are shown in Figure 12 . Comparing the result of all periodic tasks and the result of all sporadic tasks, we can find that the algorithms perform better with more sporadic tasks. It shows an ascending trend as the proportion of sporadic tasks increases. However, the change in the performance is less than 1%, which is subtle. Hence, our inference algorithms are fairly agnostic to the actual mix of sporadic/periodic tasks in the system. Figure 10 : The impact of the victim task's position in the task sets grouped by the number of tasks in a task set. The results suggest that a victim task with higher priority makes it hard for the algorithms to make a correct inference. This result stands throughout different number of tasks in a task set. Figure 11 : The impact of the victim task's position in the task sets grouped by utilization. It shows that a high priority victim task with low task set utilization reduces the inference performance. This explains the huge drop in Figure 9 .
5) Coverage Ratio and The Maximum Reconstruction Duration:
The experiments above show that the algorithms can reach certain inference success rate and precision when C(τ o , τ v ) ≥ 1 and λ = GCD(p o , p v ). However, attackers may face a victim system where C(τ o , τ v ) < 1. That is, the observer task's execution is not guaranteed to appear in all p v time columns (i.e., condition 2 in Theorem 4). To evaluate the performance of the algorithms against such a case, we generate task sets with 0 < C(τ o , τ v ) < 1 (thus λ = e o ) and run the algorithms for a duration of 10 · LCM (p o , p v ). In this experiment, task sets are grouped by coverage ratio from Figure 13 shows the results. It suggests that the attacker may fail to infer the victim task's initial offset when the coverage ratio is low. When the observer has about half coverage of the time columns (the group of [0.401, 0.5]), it yields 59.9% in success rate and 0.819 for the averaged inference precision ratio. As more time columns are observed by the observer task, the precision and success rate increase. This is because higher coverage ratios give the algorithms a higher chance to capture the true arrival column and remove others. As a result, the inference success rate is about proportional to the coverage ratio.
VII. DISCUSSION -OTHER ATTACK TECHNIQUES AND POTENTIAL DEFENSE STRATEGIES
Other Attack Techniques: Besides ScheduLeak, we also examined other techniques that can potentially yield the same (timing) information. A possible strategy is to utilize Linux commands ps and top. However, these commands provide only basic process information (e.g., priorities, runtimes) and offer coarser time resolution (in seconds). Hence, information gained from Linux commands is insufficient to determine the victim task's future execution time points.
Another strategy is to employ Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) that transforms a signals from the time to the frequency domains that seems to work at a first glance. Ideally, one may obtain the phase information along with the frequency spectrum for the given signal with using DFT. However, when mapping the system schedule to the discrete signal (i.e., signal amplitude "1" for CPU busy and "0" for CPU idle) and applying DFT, this pair of information may not be directly used to infer the task's initial offset. One reason is that, unlike different signals accumulating as waveforms in the time domain, in a system schedule an execution interval is partitioned and deferred in the case of preemption -this distorts the original periodic signals in the frequency domain and hence makes the corresponding phase information unusable. Other factors that make DFT even more unfeasible include varying execution times and existence of other sporadic tasks.
Yet, DFT produces a list of possible frequencies residing in the given system schedule. With further analysis, one may determine a subset of frequencies that correspond to some periodic tasks in the system. As a result, DFT is in fact useful (and complementary) for the attackers to detect potential task periods before launching the ScheduLeak attack which requires the victim task's period to be known beforehand.
Potential Defense Strategies: One strategy could be to enforce a low coverage ratio between any low priority task and the critical real-time task by adjusting the task parameters. This reduces the attacker's observability/capability (based on results from Section VI-C5). However, any change in the task parameters must fulfill both real-time requirements as well as the required performance. Thus, changing the task parameters may not always be applicable in real-time systems especially the legacy systems that are already deployed.
Since the proposed algorithms rely on the repeating patterns of the victim task, a potential countermeasure is to perturb the periodicity of the system schedule. Yet, the measure will not be trivial due to the real-time constraints of real-time tasks. A careless solution can easily cause some real-time tasks to miss their deadlines and lead to a system failure. A randomization protocol for a rate-monotonic scheduler presented by Yoon et al. [18] is a good attempt on removing the scheduler side-channel for RTS. However, their work is not applicable in our case because they only focus on the systems with all periodic tasks while our work is feasible on the systems with both periodic and sporadic tasks (which is the case in most real-time control systems). Therefore, an effective solution would need to consider covering both task types.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The problem of information leakage via side-channels has been well studied in the literature. For instance, it has been shown that cache-based side-channels can be invaluable for information leakage [19] , [20] , [10] , [11] . With the advent of multi-tenant public clouds, cache-based side-channels and their defenses have received renewed interest (e.g., [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] ). Other types of side-channels such as differential power analysis [25] , electromagnetic and frequency analysis [26] , [27] have also been studied. Our focus here is on scheduler side-channels in real-time systems.
There has also been some work on information flow via schedulers. Kadloor et al. [28] presented a methodology for quantifying side-channel leakage for first-come-first-serve and time-division-multiple-access schedulers. Gong and Kiyavash [29] carried out analysis for deterministic work-conserving schedulers and discovered a lower bound for the total information leakage. The problem where two users form a covert channel in a shared scheduler to steal private information from a secure system is studied by Ghassami et al. [2] . There are also other work focusing on real-time schedulers. Son et al. [3] highlighted the susceptibility of the fixed-priority schedulers (with the rate-monotonic algorithm) to covert timing-channel attacks. Völp et al. [1] examined covert channels between different priorities of real-time tasks and proposed a solution to avoid such covert channels by modifying fixed-priority scheduling and altering thread blocks that potentially leak information with the idle thread. Other work by Völp et al. [30] , the authors studied information leakage over shared-resource covert channels and proposed a transformation of resource locking protocols to preserve the confidentiality guarantees of the schedulers. While the previous works focused on covert channels in some schedulers, our focus is on novel sidechannels in real-time schedulers where an unprivileged lowpriority task can infer the execution timing behaviors of highpriority real-time task(s). Also, in contrast to covert channels that rely on actively preempting real-time tasks, the sidechannel in our work does not violate any real-time constraints and the observer task only observes its own behavior.
Our preliminary, unpublished work [31] , [32] explored the possibility of reconstructing the complete task schedule of a real-time system. However, that goal is accomplished under a different, stronger attacker model that requires (i) the system to contain all periodic real-time tasks, (ii) the attacker to know the profile of the entire task set before attacking the system and (iii) the observer task to be the lowest priority task in the system. In contrast, in this paper we focus on the much harder problem (targeting a more realistic system model) and explore what an attacker is capable of inferring with minimum knowledge and resources in the system.
The integration of security into real-time schedulers is a developing area of research. Mohan et al. [12] offered a consideration of real-time system security requirements as a set of scheduling constraints. They introduced a modified fixedpriority scheduling algorithm that integrates security levels into scheduling decisions. Pellizzoni et al. [13] extended the above scheme to a more general task model and also proposed an optimal priority assignment method that determines the task preemptibility. Some researchers also have focused on defense techniques for real-time systems (e.g., [33] , [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] ). However, these solutions do not protect the systems from the ScheduLeak attack.
The most closely related solution is to adopt a randomization technique to obfuscate the schedule. Yoon et al. [18] introduced a randomization protocol for a preemptive, fixedpriority scheduler that works with only (fully) periodic tasks. Krüger et al. [39] built upon this by proposing an online job randomization algorithm for time-triggered systems. Nevertheless, these solutions are not applicable to most real-time control systems in which a preemptive, fixed-priority scheduler supports both periodic and sporadic real-time tasks. This leaves those systems still vulnerable to our ScheduLeak attack.
IX. CONCLUSION
Successful security breaches in control systems (including cyber-physical systems) with real-time properties can have catastrophic effects. In many such systems, knowledge of the precise timing information of critical tasks could be beneficial to adversaries. Our work in this paper demonstrates how to capture this schedule timing information in a stealthy manner i.e., without being detected or causing any perturbations to the original system. Designers of such systems now need to be cognizant of such attack vectors and design the system to include countermeasures that can thwart potential intruders. The end result is that real-time systems can be more robust to security threats overall. Figure 14 : The schedule of the task set in Example 1 plotted on a schedule ladder diagram with a width of p v . This is not a part of our algorithms, but gives us an insight into the correlation of the behaviors between the observer task and the victim. It shows that time columns [1, 3) are always occupied by either the victim task or other higher priority tasks.
